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“To the people, food is heaven.” – Mencius   
Section One: Introduction 
Is growth good for the poor? In theory, yes. As one influential report on China’s “War on 
Poverty” suggested, ”Obviously robust economic growth helps reduce poverty, as long as the 
gains are reasonably distributed” (Rozelle et al. 2000). In practice as well, growth is often a 
crucial ingredient in the poverty reduction recipe. While this relationship is well founded, 
important exceptions present themselves – some areas grow, but poverty persists; the 
economies of other areas remain apparently stagnant, yet poverty diminishes. These exceptions, 
if studied, will not only illuminate further the causal relationship between these two concepts, 
but also provide hope for areas for which few prospects of growth exist. This paper examines 
two neighboring poor Chinese provinces, which faced similar challenges and shared similar 
characteristics. One grew sluggishly, but the rural poor experienced striking improvement; the 
other grew rapidly, but its poor people saw few gains, a pattern that can be seen between at 
least 1991 to the present. 
The first is Guizhou, a notoriously poor province in a remote southwest corner of China.1 
As shown in Table 1, Guizhou in 1991 performed poorly as measured both by its GNP/capita 
                                                     
1 For purposes of this paper, references to “China” refer to “Mainland China,” and exclude data related 
to Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao.  
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(RMB 890,2 last among the 30 provinces considered3) and by percentage of the population living 
below the international poverty line (59 percent, ranking 28 of 30). Moreover, between 1991 and 
1996, its economy grew sluggishly, ranking 29th for growth between 1991 and 1996.4 In spite of 
this poor economic performance both overall and in relation to its neighbor, Yunnan, however, 
between 1991 and 1996, Guizhou province, according to World Bank statistics, stood among the 
leaders (3rd of 30) in poverty reduction, its poverty rate dropping 31 percentage points, from 59 
percent to 28 percent. 
Province Per capita GDP 
(1991) Rank 
Poverty rate (1991) 
Rank 
Per Capita GDP 
Growth rate 
(1991-1996) Rank 
Poverty change 
(1991-1996) Rank 
Guizhou 30 28 29 3 
Yunnan 25 23 13 29 
Table 1: Economic rankings for Guizhou and Yunnan (rankings among 30 provinces). Source: 
Author’s calculations 
By contrast, Guizhou’s neighbor, Yunnan experienced rapid economic growth but little 
decline in poverty rates. Also a poor province, ranking in 1991 25th of 30 in per capita GDP and 
23rd in the proportion of the population below the international poverty line (44 percent), 
Yunnan’s nominal GDP nearly tripled from RMB 51.7 billion in 1991 to RMB 149 billion in 1996 
(its growth rate ranking 13th overall – remarkable for a western province). In spite of this, the 
province ranked 29th in overall poverty change between 1991 and 1996. Expressed in human 
terms and calculated based on China’s poverty line, the ranks of Guizhou’s poor declined from 
6.2 million in 1991 to 3.8 million in 1996, a difference of 2.4 million people. By contrast, poverty 
                                                     
2 The exchange rate has until recently been pegged at approximately RMB 8.2/US dollar. The population 
and area statistics for Guizhou and Yunnan come from Statistical Yearbooks.  
3 These statistics also exclude Chongqing. 
4 This information is based on the most reliable source for disaggregated poverty information in China 
currently available, a World Bank (2001) report, “China: Overcoming Poverty.” This report provides 
complete, relatively reliable poverty-level data for only two years, 1991 and 1996. The other two years 
reported in the study (1989 and 1990) are not reliable, according to one of the study’s authors (Chen 
2002).  
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in Yunnan claimed an additional 2.2 million people over the same period, with the number of 
poor rising from 5.5 million in 1991 to 7.7 million in 1996 (World Bank 2001).  
While the data from the World Bank measure these trends only to 1996,5 Figure 1, which 
compares the net rural income of poor and non-poor counties in the provinces, suggests this 
pattern continued past 1996, to at least 2002. Using data on per capita rural net income as a 
proxy for poverty, and calculating that measure separately for poor and non-poor counties of 
both provinces, as categorized by China’s central government, we can compare income levels of 
Guizhou and Yunnan’s poor and non-poor counties. Poor counties within Guizhou and Yunnan 
in 1992 had similar per capita net rural incomes (RMB 466 versus RMB 464). However, despite 
an economic growth rate that drastically outpaced Guizhou’s, nominal net rural incomes in 
                                                     
5 In May of 2005, a World Bank economist provided for me her dataset of Guizhou and Yunnan’s 
headcount poverty data to 2002, on the condition that I not publish them. They are consistent with the 
patterns seen in the net income data.  
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Yunnan). Source: Guizhou and Yunnan Statistical Yearbooks, various years. 
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Yunnan’s poor counties increased on average three percentage points slower each year to 2002, 
compared to Guizhou’s poor counties. Meanwhile, increases in incomes of Yunnan’s non-poor 
counties outpaced that of Guizhou’s over that period. 6 For both these two sources of data, the 
pattern is similar, suggesting that: a) poverty continued to fall in Guizhou at a faster rate than in 
Yunnan, despite Yunnan’s superior rate of economic growth, and b) Yunnan’s non-poor 
counties received most of the benefits from economic growth in the province. This pattern 
appears to be valid from 1991 to at least 2002. 
Section Two: The Puzzle 
What explains this unexpected pattern? By asking this question, the present paper aspires 
to contribute to a broader debate concerning what explains the disconnect between two 
concepts—development and poverty. Specifically, I look at one form of ‘development,’ as 
evidenced by measures such as economic growth, industrialization and increased technology, 
and ‘poverty reduction,’ as indicated by declining numbers of poor people. Most scholars 
expect that economic growth is inversely related to poverty rates, an argument that most starkly 
presented in a paper penned by a pair of World Bank economists, David Dollar and Aart Kraay. 
Analyzing worldwide and historical data, they conclude, “It should come as no surprise that 
the general relationship between growth of income of the poor and growth of mean income is 
                                                     
6 Average net rural income of Guizhou’s non-poor counties started at a lower level and has yet to catch 
up to that of Yunnan’s non-poor countries, the income of which exceeds the average per capita net rural 
income of Guizhou’s non-poor counties by a wide margin, averaging about RMB 200. The picture is quite 
different, however, for poor counties. In 1992, average per capita net rural incomes of the poor counties of 
Yunnan and Guizhou were nearly identical. However, by 1995, the average annual per capita net rural 
income for Guizhou’s poor counties exceeded that of Yunnan’s, despite Yunnan’s much higher overall 
growth rate. In fact, by 2002, the net rural income of Guizhou exceeded that of Yunnan by about 15 
percent. According to this data, sometime around 1993, Guizhou’s poor counties experienced an unusual 
growth spurt. Rural net incomes in Guizhou’s poor counties increased rapidly, overtaking the rural 
income of Yunnan’s poor counties by 1996, and continued to exceed Yunnan’s until at least 2002. This 
pattern reinforces confidence in the puzzle: despite much faster overall economic growth, the per capita 
net rural income of Yunnan’s poor counties did not keep pace with that of Guizhou’s, despite Yunnan’s 
far superior growth rates. 
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one-to-one,” (2000, 28).7 This contention contrasts with the more common belief that economic 
growth is often necessary, but insufficient, for poverty reduction; intervention, often by the 
government, is needed to ensure that the poor benefit from growth.  
In this project, I participate in the debate on whether growth actually ‘is good for the poor,’ 
as the title of the report referred to above contends. I do so not by directly refuting or 
supporting this argument, but by examining two unexpected cases one Chinese province in 
which poverty declined despite China’s slowest economic growth, another in which robust 
economic growth failed to reduce poverty.8 I explore the kinds of development and the types of 
activities that support poor rural people in improving their lives by adopting qualitative 
methodology of structured, focused comparative case study (e.g., George 1979; Bennett and 
George 2002) of the type called for many years ago by China scholars (e.g., Chung 1995). 
Comparing cases of unexpected poverty change permits examinations of theories on how best 
to reduce poverty, involving the use of government and private actors, as well as engaging a 
public policy debate on the effectiveness of alternative strategies. It is my hope that these 
insights will not be irrelevant to the issues faced by other poor countries and economies. 
For this study, I adopted five different methods to collect data, including: 1) studying 
analytical and scholarly articles from Western and Chinese sources; 2) interviewing relevant 
officials and scholars in Beijing and both provincial capitals; 3) conducting fieldwork in both 
provinces, allowing direct observation of candidate explanations for the puzzle; 4) conducting 
semi-structured interviews with villagers and officials in dozens of counties and villages in the 
                                                     
7 Finding a close correlation between growth and poverty reduction, the authors, by contrast, suggest 
there is little role for the government other than opening the economy, introducing rule of law, keeping 
inflation in check, and spending less. This paper sparked controversy throughout the academic and 
policy communities, with some supporting it (e.g., Bigsten and Levin 2001), and others criticizing it (e.g., 
Weisbrot et al. 2000; Rodrik 2000; Oxfam 2000). 
8 The two cases were chosen because they were data points furthest away from a regression line 
generated by modeling the effect of growth on poverty in China’s provinces 
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two target provinces; and 5) analyzing statistical data collected by a variety of organizations. 
Each of these methods has its biases and points of view. My fieldwork was conducted in the 10 
months between September 2003 and July 2004, and a follow up trip in Summer 2005). Through 
these five methods, I hope to “triangulate.” 
Section Three: A Search for Key Factors 
To explain this puzzle, we seek factors that explain the increase in growth in Yunnan 
without a corresponding decrease in poverty and/or (preferably ‘and’) factors that explain the 
decrease in poverty in Guizhou without a corresponding increase in growth. The factors should 
in combination affect millions of people. My research involved exploring each of these 
numerous factors – geographic, natural, demographic, cultural, economic and political – that 
can be used to explain this puzzle (Table 2). While most studies examine the relationship 
between economic growth and poverty reduction in the aggregate, this study reminds us that 
the specific distribution and structure of economic growth, and the policies used to generate it, 
cannot be ignored. Thus for each factor, I focus not just on volume (for instance, how much 
‘road’ there is), but also distribution (is the road located in poor areas or in rich?) and structure 
(is the road accessible to poor people, or primarily to wealthy people?).  
Geographic/ 
Natural Factors 
Demographic 
Factors 
Cultural Factors Government/ 
Policy Factors 
- Mountainous 
terrain 
- Natural resource 
endowments 
- Arable land per 
capita 
- Natural disasters 
(flooding/ 
drought) 
- Weather (rain/ 
temperature) 
- Population/ 
population 
growth 
- Migration 
- Motivation 
- Minority 
Ethnicities 
- Civil Society 
 
 
- Central policy 
- International 
organization 
support 
- Corruption 
- Overall spending 
- Education/health 
- Central 
government 
transfers 
- Transportation/ 
infrastructure 
- Local taxation 
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Industrial 
Structure 
Agricultural 
Production 
Industrial 
Production 
Services/Other 
Econ Factors 
- Industrial 
structure (GDP) 
- Industrial 
structure (Labor) 
- Overall 
agricultural 
production 
- Grain, meat, 
tobacco and other 
agricultural 
product 
production 
- Farm implements 
- Fertilizer use 
 
 
- Town-village 
Enterprises 
- Non-agricultural 
industrial 
production (steel, 
chemicals, 
textiles, etc.) 
- Power generation 
- Agricultural 
added-value 
industries 
- Coal/other 
mining materials 
- Inflation 
- Foreign trade 
- Foreign capital 
usage 
- Tourism 
 
Table 2: Candidate factors 
That some of these factors are against expectations is surprising. Space allows for 
exemplifying only a couple of rejected factors – I’d be happy to respond to questions about 
others. For instance, government spending is a commonly cited factor affecting poverty and 
growth. However, Guizhou, both as a whole, and its poor counties, spent far less than Yunnan. 
Between 1991 and 1996, Yunnan spent between 45 to 58 percent more per capita that Guizhou. 
Yunnan’s government spending relative to its GDP was among China’s highest, and in most 
years after 1991 Yunnan led all of China’s 
provinces (Figure 2).9 Guizhou, for its part, 
although spending more relative to its GDP 
than the average province, spends far less than 
Yunnan. Moreover, in terms of relevant 
spending, Yunnan spent far more per capita 
compared to Guizhou on such budgetary items 
                                                     
9 Yunnan led all provinces in this category each year between 1992 to 2000. The province ranked second 
behind Shanghai in 1991, and behind Beijing in 2002. 
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Figure 2: Government expenditure/GDP. 
Source: China Financial Yearbook, 
Various Years
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as support for poor areas and agricultural 
spending. Moreover, while both provinces have 
proportionally the same number of poor 
counties, the central government actually 
transferred more money to Yunnan for poverty 
alleviation than it did Guizhou. This pattern 
continues up to at least 2002. 
Primary education, also cited as a critical 
factor for poverty reduction, likewise does not 
seem to explain this pattern of poverty 
reduction and economic growth in the two 
provinces. While Guizhou provides education 
in rural, and especially poor, areas, there is little 
evidence that it does so to a greater extent than 
other provinces. For instance, provincial 
spending on education has been a fraction of 
what it is in Yunnan (Figure 3), while primary 
school enrollment rates in the two provinces were similar in 1991 and 1996, both in poor and 
non-poor counties (Figure 4). The UNDP Human Development Report (1999) rated the 
education system of China’s provinces using a measure of adult literacy rate and combined 
school enrollment rates; both Guizhou and Yunnan received the same score of 0.64, relatively 
low compared to other provinces.10 This is not to deny the nearly undeniable importance of 
                                                     
10 Fieldwork revealed some aspects of Guizhou’s education system may be better than Yunnan’s  I saw 
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education for poverty reduction, both in general and in Guizhou. Yet, because education does 
not vary within Yunnan and Guizhou, it does not explain our pattern of poverty reduction 
without economic growth. 
Section Four: Analysis of Key Factors 
What then did the two provinces do to generate these different results? Three factors 
appear to be especially critical: roadways, migration and tourism.11  
Factor 1: Roadway - If you want to become wealthy, first build a road (Chinese saying)12 
Roads are indeed often cited as crucial for both economic growth and poverty reduction – 
but how can they explain growth without poverty reduction (and vice versa)? Road types are 
numerous, with myriad functions and contrasting effects on growth and poverty. For instance, 
highways can serve as efficient conduits of imports and exports, facilitate linkages for 
investment and aid, convey people reliably and conveniently to and from neighboring 
provinces, and more comfortably transport visitors to popular tourist areas. Highways thus 
potentially contribute a great deal toward promoting economic growth (Jalilian and Weiss 2004; 
Estache 2004). However, unless a poor person lives adjacent to highways or convenient feeder 
roads, he or she will not benefit directly from highway construction. Highways by themselves 
                                                                                                                                                                           
numerous examples of newly constructed schools, many funded by the four wealthy costal cities that 
have partnered with Guizhou to help reduce poverty. However, these examples provide little evidence 
that the quality of rural education is significantly better in Guizhou or in Yunnan, especially in the 1990s. 
However, research on the Indian state of Kerala consistently emphasizes the importance of the volumes 
of funds spent on education, which in our situation does not apply. More research is needed on this 
question. 
11 Another factor, coal mining, was omitted from this report for lack of space. 
12 The complete expression seems to be, “If you hope to become wealthy, first build a road, have fewer 
children and plant more trees,” (要想富，先修路，少生孩子，多种树). Apparently coined in Shandong 
early in the reform era, this slogan has several variations, including that of one exuberant vice-director of 
Guangxi Province’s Bureau of Transportation, Zeng Zuoshi who argues, “If you hope to become wealthy, 
first build a road! A big road brings great wealth, a small road brings small wealth, and no road means no 
wealth,” (Xia 2005). 
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are rarely sufficient to reduce poverty among dispersed, often isolated rural populations, and 
they are too costly to serve large numbers of far-flung farmers. 
By contrast, a country road linking poor villages to nearby market towns can make a 
significant difference in the lives and livelihoods of poor rural residents for a fraction of the cost 
of a highway (Fan and Chan-Kang 2004). Country roads vary a great deal in quality and width – 
from concrete roads to dirt roads. Since towns in China have long been the locus of markets 
(Skinner 1964), their importance to the economy and their role in linking towns to villages is 
central. For the rural poor, a modest paved road, or even a dirt road that leads to a market town 
or county center, makes a greater difference by increasing access to markets and information. 
Country roads can also reduce the price of agricultural inputs such as seed, fertilizers and tools 
and increase farm productivity. Reducing time to markets also enhances incentives to produce 
marketable products, and over time can increase confidence in the value of investing in or 
borrowing money for expensive productive assets such as fruit trees. Navigable roads also 
expand the range of middlemen who drive into rural areas to buy surplus agriculture directly 
from the farmers and sell it in further flung markets. Most research, however, does not separate 
roads by type, which might explain the mixed results in studies of roads and poverty reduction.  
At the start of the 1990s, both Yunnan and Guizhou embarked on strikingly different 
transportation improvement schemes. Overall, although Guizhou also planned a modest 
highway system, the province constructed many more rural roads of the type that the literature 
suggests are important for reducing poverty. Yunnan by contrast focused primarily on 
constructing high quality highways and an expressway, forming an ambitious transportation 
system, featuring six high-speed highways. These political decisions affected the volume, 
distribution and most importantly, structure of each province’s road system, which in turn 
affected poverty reduction and economic growth in contrasting ways. 
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While Yunnan had more road length than Guizhou for much of the 1990s, Guizhou had a 
higher road density (road length per area) (Figure 5). In 1991, Guizhou’s overall road density of 
17.9 km/100 km2 exceeded Yunnan’s 14.75 km/100 km2. By 1996, when Yunnan’s total roadway 
length of 70279 kilometers was the third longest of any province in China, compared to 
Guizhou’s rank of 20, Guizhou’s total density of roadway still exceeded Yunnan’s (18.58 
km/100 km2 to 17.83731). Moreover, although Yunnan province constructed new roadway at a 
brisker pace compared to Guizhou, Yunnan’s road density did not catch up with Guizhou’s 
until after 1998.  
More importantly, Yunnan and Guizhou’s roads were of different types. Starting in 1992, 
Yunnan announced plans for its highway system – an ambitious plan that focused on a set of six 
highways radiating out from the central axis of Kunming, the province’s capital. Three of these 
linked Kunming with three major border crossings, while three further roads linked Kunming 
with three provincial capitals. The six spurs, consisting primarily of class 1 and 2 highways 
together would total 3,458 kilometers. Guizhou province that same year announced plans for 
three main roadways, one east-
west highway linking Hunan 
with Yunnan, and two north-
south roads, one linking 
Guiyang with Guangxi and 
Chongqing. The volume of 
funds used to finance roadway 
investments also contrasted 
between the two provinces. Even 
Figure 5: Road density in Yunnan and Guizhou. 
Source: Yunnan and Guizhou Statistical Yearbooks, 
Various Years 
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with its more modest ambitions, for this entire plan Guizhou needed an estimated RMB 12 
billion, but could provide only a fraction of that (Gong 1996). Whereas Yunnan spent nearly 
RMB 1 billion in 1992, Guizhou’s spending did not reach that level until 1996.13 Perhaps for this 
reason, Guizhou’s eastern spur, 14 years after its planning, has not yet been completed as 
recently as the spring of 2004. Not only did Guizhou focus its limited transportation funding on 
areas where it could benefit poor people, but what highways it did construct were better 
distributed, compared to Yunnan’s, in terms of linking poor areas. On the other hand, Yunnan’s 
highways promoted trade flows with each of its neighbors and helped to increase tobacco 
production tourism. These effects stimulated economic growth, but, due to the distribution and 
structure of the province’s new roadways, did not help as much to reduce poverty.  
Although Guizhou formalized its plans for building roadways in the early 1990s, its 
strategy of using rural roadways to reduce poverty dates back to the mid-1980s. The central role 
that country roads play in Guizhou’s anti-poverty efforts dates back to Guizhou’s first formal 
anti-poverty plans, promulgated in March 1986, when current Chinese General Secretary Hu 
Jintao served as the Secretary of Guizhou’s Communist Party (Guizhou Yearbook 1987). A key 
element of the “Directives Concerning the Work of Strengthening Poor Areas” was the 
construction of roads of a particular type: town and village roads that would connect remote 
areas to the nearest market towns and quicken response times to natural disasters. This strategy 
continued throughout the early to mid-1990s, when Guizhou reaffirmed the importance of rural 
road systems as a part of its poverty reduction policies. In 1991, for instance, the key 
                                                     
13 In 1991, Guizhou’s announced fixed capital investments in roadways was RMB 79.1 million, which 
climbed to RMB 1.1 billion in 1996. Yunnan, in contrast, spent RMB 971 million in 1992, RMB 1.75 billion 
in 1993 and RMB 1.56 billion in 1994 on roadways alone. Overall for the eighth five-year plan (1991-1995), 
Yunnan spent over RMB 7 billion on roadway construction.  
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infrastructure projects initiated 
by the province continued this 
rural roadway system, linking 
village to townships. As two 
Guizhou scholars summarize 
this part of the strategy,  
In 1991, a key provincial 
infrastructure project 
was to construct, expand, 
deepen and repaved 
public roadways, 
especially emphasizing 
the proactive application 
of the Food-for-Work 
program to build mountain roads, link administrative villages with navigable 
roads, and to support the construction of township and village roadways. (Wang 
and Zhang 2003, p. 403) 
Also in the early 1990s, Guizhou further expanded this plan, by including the expansion of 
roadways linking township to counties. These plans were explicitly tied to poverty reduction, as 
when Guizhou’s 1994 plan for poverty reduction highlighted the use of rural roadways as a key 
element of its anti-poverty plan, by constructing “local roadways for poor towns and 
townships, as well as most market places and commercial areas,” (Guizhou Yearbook 1991, 
1995). Overall, between 1989 and 1999, Guizhou invested more than RMB 4 billion to build 8,919 
km of road linking county and township, thereby connecting for the first time 315 townships 
with their county cities (Ran and Lie 2000). Based on partial statistics, road density of Guizhou’s 
“non-graded roads” far exceeded that of Yunnan’s (Guizhou and Yunnan Statistical Yearbooks, 
various years). The density of such roads by the mid-1990s in Guizhou (12.78 km/100 km2) 
exceeded Yunnan’s (7.58 km/100 km2) by about forty percent (Figure 6). Moreover, while 
Guizhou claimed to have built more than 2000 kilometers of village-to-market roads in the years 
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and Yunnan. (Various sources) 
  14 
between 1993 and 1996, official data from Yunnan indicates that the length of such roads 
declined between 1991 and 1996. For its well-developed highway system (which supported 
trade and tourism in the province – thus sparking increased GDP but little poverty reduction), 
however, Yunnan has a relatively underdeveloped country road system (ranking 12th in China 
for length and 16th for total density). Guizhou on the other hand ranks third in China for 
county road. Moreover, although it might seem counterintuitive, the country roads I saw in 
Guizhou were of much higher quality than those in Yunnan. More packed, less muddy during 
the rain, and wider, often with borders on each side, Guizhou’s country roads tended to be 
much more navigable, thus likely reducing costs and facilitating transport to market. Therefore, 
based on both statistical data and fieldwork, a key element of Guizhou’s development included 
the construction of low-level roadways, the kind that is vital for the village-level economy, 
though of limited use for economic growth in the province. 
Thus, the distribution and structure of the roadways in both provinces, and the economic 
effects of such roads, were generally consistent with our expectations. Yunnan’s main strategy 
in its road construction policy was to focus its resources on building highways, which 
successfully stimulated the province’s exports and supported the development of the tourism 
industry. Guizhou for its part concentrated on rural roadways, becoming in the process a 
leading province in density of such roadways.  
 
Factor 2: Migration – Move a tree and it dies, move a man and he thrives (Chinese proverb) 
Starting in the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping’s reforms sparked fresh waves of migrant flows 
in China, flows that had been dammed through strict controls over population movement 
established in the early years of the People’s Republic of China. It was rural-to-urban migration 
that dominated this period, as tens millions of primarily young rural laborers brought 
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inexpensive labor to cities of all sizes, further stimulating industrialization and construction in 
China’s coastal cities. Such flows reduced poverty in the countryside, both by reducing mouths 
to feed and by adding the small-but-significant remittances farmers’ family earnings in the 
countryside. Many migrant families also saved a portion of these remittances, accumulating the 
capital needed to start small businesses once the migrant, newly endowed with experience and 
new skills, returned to the countryside.14 According to recent research, remittances benefited 
poor households. Whereas migrant income constituted about 43 percent of the incomes of the 
wealthiest 50 percent, it represented 62 percent of the total income of the poorest 10 percent of 
households in the sample. Migration diversifies household incomes, reducing the dependency 
of rural households on income from agriculture. Whereas two-thirds of the incomes of 
households without migrants consist of agriculture-based income, that figure drops to 46.2 
percent for households with migrants (Du et al. 2004, pp. 13-4). Among residents of China’s 
poor counties, controlling for resource endowments, households with migrants tend to have per 
capita incomes 12 percent higher than those households without migrants. (Du et al. 2004, pp. 
12-6).15  
Migration also helps spur urban development and growth. Migrants contribute to the 
growth of areas to which they migrate by providing low-wage services that urban workers, 
                                                     
14 The vast majority of migrants work diligently and spend frugally, mailing the bulk of their earnings to 
their home villages to provide for basic family needs, the education of siblings, the improvement of 
housing, or other necessities. A study by Qian (1996) shows that such remittances are of a scale that 
makes a major difference in the household economy, although these effects are felt primarily on 
household income. By comparing net income of migrants with those of an average rural family at the 
origin, Ma also shows that remittances are especially beneficial in poorer non-coastal provinces, where 
the income ratio is 5:1 in favor of families with migrants (Ma 1999, p. 179). Taylor and his colleagues also 
find that remittances make a major difference in rural incomes, increasing them between 16-43 percent. A 
study of six provinces in 2000 concludes that the average migrant remits one-third of their total income 
(RMB 908), and that families back home receive on average RMB 465 per person, or 77 percent of their 
own earned wages. Migrant remittances as a proportion of total income are greater the poorer the family. 
15 Using a different poverty line, Du and his colleagues find that poverty rates after remittances declined 
from 67.1 percent to 49.2 percent. 
  16 
endowed until the mid-1990s with cradle-to-grave job protection and urban hukou that 
guaranteed them a degree of social protection, are unwilling to perform (Knight et al. 1999). In 
contrast to its impact on urban areas, however, migration contributes only modestly to the 
income growth of the rural area of origin. Since migrants are almost exclusively the youngest, 
best-educated and most vigorous people from their village (Rozelle et al. 1999; Yang and Guo 
1999; Hare 1999), migration often removes from the village the most productive workers.16 Over 
the long-term, however, migration can help develop rural areas, primarily through remittances 
used to start businesses when the migrant returns home. However, the extent to which this 
occurs, especially in poor areas, is contentious.17 Overall, migration brings to urban China far 
more economic growth that it does to rural China (especially for poor areas), although poor 
rural areas have benefited through reduced poverty.  
Although Guizhou and Yunnan shared many attributes throughout the 1980s that allow us 
to expect that the patterns of migration within the two provinces would be similar, the actual 
migration rates in the two provinces proved to be dramatically different. While both provinces 
are similar regionally, geographically and demographically, Guizhou had a much higher rate of 
migration that Yunnan during the 1990s. During the mid-to-late 1980s, migration rates in both 
provinces (like those in most western provinces save Sichuan) were low, as rural residents were 
constrained – by legal restrictions, lack of information and insufficiently developed migrant 
networks – from participating extensively in migration at that time. However, starting in the 
                                                     
16 In two villages with significant remittances that Qian surveys, migration actually reduced agricultural 
production because of the loss of labor. He concludes, “the impact of out-migration on local economic 
development in these two villages turned out to be more negative, although some of the remittances were 
invested in some small household businesses,” (Qian 1996, p. 138).  
17 A survey by Taylor and his colleagues found weak evidence that households reinvest remittances in 
“self-employed activities,” and also found that these investments rarely returned immediate profits 
(Taylor et al. 2003, p. 94). Another survey of five villages revealed that while remittances in four villages 
increased household income, in only two of these villages did migration spur new businesses (Qian 1996). 
During fieldwork, I saw few examples of remittance-based investment in businesses. 
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late 1980s and increasingly in the early 1990s, Guizhou saw a surge of migration, reaching a rate 
that eventually exceeded average flows in China and in the country’s southwest, dwarfing 
Yunnan’s more modest increases. In Guizhou, this created a virtuous cycle as initial migrants 
sought opportunities for and otherwise encourage friends and relatives to migrate, reflecting 
“chain migration” that is common throughout China (Rozelle et al. 1999).  Guizhou’s significant 
migration flows, though earlier than Yunnan’s, began later than those from other inland 
provinces such as Anhui and Sichuan. The relatively few years of experience translated to more 
modest salaries for migrants. While remittances sent back home were crucial to reducing 
poverty among the families of migrants, it was less often sufficient to invest in productive 
businesses. Although Guizhou’s inexpensive labor contributed to stimulating economic growth, 
because large numbers of laborers worked outside the province, migration contributed to the 
GDP of other provinces, primarily Guangdong and Jiangsu. Thus, in Guizhou, migration 
contributes to the explanation of the pattern we saw emerging in the 1990s: poverty reduction 
without economic growth.  
Meanwhile, Yunnan’s labor flows, whether internal or outside the province, were among 
China’s lowest. Because the majority of Yunnan’s relatively few rural migrants stayed within 
the province, their labor contributed to both economic growth and poverty reduction in the 
province. Yunnan’s relative low rates of migration meant that Yunnan did not benefit from 
migration’s ability to reduce poverty.18 Three national sources of migration data for Guizhou 
                                                     
18 In fact, the differences between the two provinces were stark enough to lead one economist to cite 
Guizhou and Yunnan as examples to emulate and to avoid, respectively, in stimulating migration. 
“Where there is labor migration, there is also a rapid increase in wealth. At least such places collect 
together remittances from migrants, the return of funding, quickly collect into start-up capital. For 
example, Guizhou and Hunan, the great provinces for labor migration. Over the past several years, 
through migration, won the objective return of capital, and helped individuals become rich, and helped 
regions develop … Yunnan has natural resources, people from Yunnan are lazy, and rarely go to work 
outside. Their economy is clearly worse than other places,” (Lu 2004) 
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and Yunnan (the 1990 and 2000 censuses and the 1995 1% survey), as well as annual yearbooks 
reveal that Guizhou residents tended to migrate far more frequently Yunnan residents; 
moreover, when Guizhou residents migrated, they tended to quit the province entirely, whereas 
Yunnan-based migrants tended to stay within the province.19  
Between the mid-1980s and 1990, the migration rate among rural residents from Guizhou 
and Yunnan was lower than the both the national and regional average. According to the 1990 
census, Guizhou and Yunnan residents were among the least likely to migrate in China. Some 
777,500 Guizhou residents (or about 2.4 percent of the whole population, rank 24) and one 
million Yunnan residents (about 2.7 percent, rank 19) had by then settled somewhere other than 
their hometowns, out of a total of 34 million Chinese who had by then left their hometowns. 
Overall, the pattern seen in Guizhou and Yunnan is consistent with the patterns seen in China 
as a whole, in that migrants during this period primarily hailed from coastal provinces. 
However, even when compared to their southwestern counterparts, rural residents from 
Guizhou and Yunnan migrated less frequently.20 Despite the similarity between the volume of 
migrants in Yunnan and Guizhou, one enduring element of the difference between the two 
provinces became evident during this period: Guizhou migrants tended to migrate out of the 
                                                     
19 Chinese statistical sources of migration are difficult to use. First, the data underestimate the incidence 
of migration. Many migrants, especially in the early years, moved illegally and, despite the improving 
legal infrastructure in China, still experienced social discrimination. For this reason, is not surprising that 
poor rural migrants might avoid social scientists and census takers, increasing the difficulty of reporting 
accurate estimations of the size and flow of migration. Second, the 1990 and 2000 censuses and the 1995 
1% survey calculate migration rates in different ways. The 1990 census reports all those who are away 
from where they lived long-term five years previously (including in-province migration), whereas the 
2000 census reports anyone living in a province other than the one in which they are registered. The 1% 
survey may be less accurate than the census in terms of its sampling. With these caveats in mind, a 
general pattern nevertheless emerges from these primary sources, as well from secondary social science 
research. 
20 For instance, Sichuan during this period ranked as the largest source of migrants by total population 
(although the province ranked 11 by proportion of its population that had migrated, either within the 
province or outside it).  
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province more frequently than their Yunnan counterparts. According to the 1990 census, of 
Guizhou’s 777,500 migrants, 40 percent (the 9th highest ratio in China) settled in other 
provinces. Of the more than one million migrants from Yunnan, only 27 percent (the 19th 
highest ratio in China) migrated out of the province by 1990.21 
The differences between Guizhou and Yunnan widened between 1990 and 1995. According 
to the 1995 1% population sample survey, migration from Guizhou slightly exceeded Yunnan’s 
in proportion to its population. This survey implies that about 2.7 percent of Guizhou’s total 
agricultural population (compared to 2.5 percent of Yunnan’s) had migrated by 1995. Whereas 
total migration rates in both provinces increased by 1990-1995, the proportion of Guizhou’s 
migrants who migrated out of the province grew, while Yunnan’s rate remained about the same 
as that in 1990. Overall, two-thirds more Guizhou rural residents left the province than did 
Yunnan residents, despite the fact that, in 1995, Yunnan’s rural population exceeded Guizhou’s 
by more than 13 percent.22  
                                                     
21 The above figures represent nearly one percent of Guizhou’s total population, ranking Guizhou 
number 17 among the 30 provinces counted, and about 0.75 percent of Yunnan’s residents, for a rank of 
25. 
22 According to the survey, about half of Guizhou’s migrants departed the province to seek work 
(compared to 40 percent in 1990), while only 30 percent of Yunnan’s migrants left the province, basically 
the same proportion as in 1990. In all, about 1.3 percent of the rural population of Guizhou left the 
province by 1995, about double the proportion in Yunnan (about 0.7 percent of the rural population of 
Yunnan left the province), according to this survey. 
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These trends in Guizhou and 
Yunnan continued between the 
years 1995-1998, according to 
Chinese provincial-level data 
(Figures 7 and 8). Calculating 
migration differently than the 
censuses, this source found that 
1.44 percent of Guizhou residents 
migrated either within or outside 
the province in 1995, far above the 
0.16 percent of Yunnan residents 
who migrated, but still below the 
2.35 percent average across 
China’s provinces. The rate of 
migration for each province grew 
steadily, with Guizhou exceeding 
the national average by 1996. By 
1998, 5.7 percent of Guizhou’s 
residents (rank of 10 in China), 
were living away from home, compared to 1.22 percent of Yunnan’s rural residents (rank of 24) 
and 4.37 percent China’s provinces as a whole. Moreover, while the majority (80 percent) of 
Guizhou migrants left the province, a minority of Yunnan migrants (around 30 percent) moved 
to other provinces. 
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Figure 7: Migration rates (inside or outside the 
province). Source: China Population Yearbook, Various 
Years
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Figure 8: Migration rates (outside the province only). 
Source: China Population Yearbook, Various Years 
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This pattern is also consistent with data from the 2000 census, which indicates that the rate 
of Guizhou’s migration outside the province continued to accelerate.23 By 2000, 1.6 million 
people with Guizhou residence permits lived long-term outside the province (4.9 percent of the 
population – rank of 9),24 nearly five times the number of people who had left the province a 
decade previously (312,800). Compared to this, the 343,542 Yunnan residence permit holders 
(0.9 percent of the population, ranking 26) living outside the province seems modest. By 2000, 
China’s southwestern provinces had among the country’s highest rates of migration overall at 
9.33 percent (the second highest region, ranking slightly lower than 9.44 percent in northeastern 
China, but higher than the national rate of 8.49 percent), and had the highest rate of migration 
to other provinces of 5.01 percent, compared to 3.42 percent nationally (Du et al. 2004, Table 4). 
Other provincial-level studies using different methods consistently suggest that Guizhou’s rural 
residents migrated more than Yunnan’s. Johnson estimates migration within provinces between 
1990-2000 by calculating the differences between expected and reported populations. In this 
way, he finds that whereas 2.27 million people left Guizhou (7 percent of the population) during 
that decade, Yunnan experienced a net gain of 730,000 people (adding two percent to its 
population) over the same period (Johnson 2002, p. 24).25 
These statistical data are also consistent with results from fieldwork. In many Guizhou 
villages, spread throughout the province, whether minority areas or not, it was less common to 
                                                     
23 According to Du and his co-authors, the 2000 census is more accurate for measuring migration, 
because it asks not only where respondents currently live but also the location of their resident permits 
(hukou) (Du et al. 2004, p. 7). However, the 2000 census measures only migrants who had left the 
province, and thus cannot be used as a source for intraprovincial migration. 
24 Compare this figure with the 3.42 percent average for China as a whole and five percent average for 
Southwest China (Du et al. 2004, Table 4). 
25 A survey of six provinces, although it does not include Guizhou, does support the conclusion that 
Yunnan’s migrants are few relative to the rest of the country, increasing from an estimated zero percent 
in 1988 to four percent in 1995, compared to national totals of five percent and 12 percent, according to 
this survey (Rozelle et al. 1999, p. 372). 
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see young people between the ages of 16-35. Interviews with households in such villages 
revealed that many of these migrants had left the province, mainly to the coastal province of 
Guangdong to work in factories or on construction sites. Most of the families had received 
remittances from migrants, though in many cases these remittances were not large – typically a 
few hundred yuan per month. Interviews with Guizhou migrants who had returned for 
festivals reinforced the conclusion that Guizhou people migrate less than those from Sichuan, 
but more than those from Yunnan. For instance, migrants I interviewed, whether working in 
Sichuan, Guangzhou or other provinces, almost invariably reported that Sichuan migrants are 
very common, far more common than Guizhou natives; however, they almost never met 
migrants from Yunnan.  
In terms of distribution, the scant quantitative data available suggest that migrants from 
Guizhou hailed from the poorest areas. For instance, a survey of rural residents (Du et al. 2004) 
in each of China’s poor counties revealed that, compared to Yunnan, Guizhou had a higher 
proportion of rural households with at least one migrant laborer. This survey indicates that 
about one in five of China’s households living in poor counties on average contain at least one 
migrant, and remittance income from those migrants likely supports these households.26  
Much more evidence is available for the impact of remittances for Guizhou’s poor areas. 
Data collected by the provincial labor employment office count only the funds that were mailed 
back home from outside the province, and do not include money that is brought back during 
holidays or money that is mailed from within the province. However, these statistics make clear 
that remittances were collectively large and important, increasing in size starting in the early 
                                                     
26 The 1990 census figures have migration statistics from each of the two province’s poor areas. The rate 
is almost identical: 41 percent of Yunnan’s migrants came from poor counties, compared to 40 percent for 
Guizhou. By the 2000 census, Yunnan’s rate had declined to 36 percent. Unfortunately, the county-level 
2000 census data for Guizhou is unavailable. 
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1990s. The volume of remittances grew 460 percent between 1991, when migrants remitted RMB 
580 million, and 1996, when remittances totaled RMB 3.25 billion. To put it into scale, the more 
than RMB 3 billion in calculated remittances is sizeable compared to RMB 8.5 billion in total 
budget expenditure for the province. (Unfortunately, I found no comparable data for Yunnan.) 
Moreover, these remittances make a major difference to the local economy. For instance, 
statistics collected by Guizhou’s provincial labor employment office conclude that remittances 
sent back by migrant laborers exceeded the entire government revenues of 22 of Guizhou’s 87 
counties and in some cases more than three times as large (Wang and Zhang 2003, p. 548). 
Thus, migration contributes to the overall pattern seen in Yunnan and Guizhou. For 
Guizhou, it helped reduce poverty, even as it contributed little to economic growth. For 
Yunnan, the effect of migration is one of a missed opportunity – since few rural residents have 
migrated, migration does not explain economic growth, although it does explain the lack of 
poverty reduction. Moreover, Yunnan appears to be trapped in a vicious cycle – that few 
migrate now, there is little basis for migration today.  
 
Factor 3: Tourism – Tourism is like a fire: you can cook your meal with it, or it can burn your house 
down (Asian Proverb) 27 
Under ideal conditions, tourism, a US$4.4 trillion industry responsible for 12 percent of the 
world’s employment, provides local people the opportunity to sell goods and services directly 
to foreign and domestic tourists, diversifies the economy, draws on the cultural and natural 
heritage that many poor countries possess. However, despite the tourist industry’s potential 
                                                     
27 The source of this quotation, which is referenced without detailed attribution in numerous sources, 
such as World Tourism Organization, Tourism and Poverty Alleviation (World Tourism Organization, 
2002), p. 22, is obscure. 
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benefits, even when tourist sites are located in poor regions, the connection between tourism 
and poverty reduction is not automatic. Although the dominant view is that tourism is a labor-
intensive, cost-effective way to develop an economy and reduce poverty, dissenters present 
conflicting evidence that tourism is instead capital-intensive, and that the costs of investing in 
tourism are high, especially compared to agriculture (Sinclair 1991; Tisdell 1998). Moreover, the 
employment generating effects of tourism is still lower than other industries, including 
agriculture, manufacturing and many other service industries (Varley 1991).  
The extent to which tourism reduces poverty depends upon whether the tourist industry is 
designed in such a way as to include or exclude the participation of the poor. While the 
development of the tourism industry can be a boon to the service sector, a major contributor to 
GDP, developers can create enclaves that intentionally exclude poor people, reducing the 
degree to which tourism benefits them. Resorts are often designed to be self-sufficient islands, 
even to the point of importing goods and services, severing the linkages between them and the 
surrounding economy, thus reducing even the indirect benefits of tourism for the poor.  
That tourism emerges as part of the explanation for our puzzling pattern of economic 
growth and poverty reduction in Guizhou and Yunnan might astonish China hands. After all, 
Yunnan, has for decades been one of China’s most popular rural-based tourist destinations. The 
number of foreign tourists visiting the province rose from a low of some 210,000 in 1991 to 
742,527 in 1996 to an excess of 2.1 million in 2001, as an increasing number of the international 
tourists visiting China included Yunnan on their list of destinations. The volume of Chinese 
tourists, a difficult statistic to interpret, 28 also apparently increased rapidly over this period, 
                                                     
28 Chinese tourists are difficult to count, especially compared to foreign ones, who are almost invariably 
asked for passports to register and until the mid-1990s used foreign exchange certificates instead of 
Renminbi. That the statistics seem extraordinarily high reflects the fact that, especially before 1993, 
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from 11.1 million in 1992 to 45 million in 2001. By the mid-1990s, Yunnan ranked as the sixth 
most popular tourist draw in China, outperforming such internationally well-known tourist 
attractions as Guangxi province’s Guilin with its inspiring Karst geography and Shaanxi’s 
Terracotta Warriors (Yunnan Statistical Yearbook, various years). Guizhou’s tourist destinations 
are simply not as renowned. While tourism was also opened in the early 1980s, when the capital 
city Guiyang and the Huangguashu waterfall (China’s largest) were opened to foreign tourists, 
the industry did not develop as quickly as that in Yunnan. Guizhou claimed only a fraction of 
the foreign visitors that flocked to Yunnan: 37,453 visits in 1990, increasing to 125,344 in 1996, 
still less than half of Yunnan’s foreign visitors in 1991. As late as 2000, Guizhou attracted less 
than 200,000-300,000 overseas tourists depending on the measure, earning the province a 
moribund rank of 24 in China (Li 2001, p. 213). According to Chinese statistics, Guizhou’s 
domestic visitors exceeded Yunnan’s (frankly hard to believe) until the mid-1990s, Chinese 
visitors to Yunnan exceeded that of Guizhou after that time. Although Guizhou year-by-year 
attracts increasing numbers of tourists, both foreign and domestic, the splendors of Guizhou are 
for now destined to remain a relative secret.  
Despite Yunnan’s much larger tourism industry, the vast majority of the province’s most 
famous tourist sites are located in non-poor rural areas (Map 1), where their popularity and 
continued expansion contribute primarily to economic growth, with a diminishing role in 
reducing poverty. By design, the province limited establishment of Yunnan’s most developed 
tourism destinations to specific spots, each of which, by 1986 when China designated counties 
as either poor or non-poor, were almost exclusively located in non-poor counties. The tourism 
industry in Yunnan recommenced soon after China itself opened to the outside world in 1978. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
China’s domestic tourism statistics included day visitors, even local families dropping by a local site for 
the afternoon (Xu 1999, p. 162-3).  
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In 1982, China’s central government included three areas of Yunnan in its national list of 
approved state-level tourism projects: the Stone Forest, Xishuangbanna and Dali, adding a 
fourth, Lijiang, by 1985. From the early 1980s, Yunnan province focused financial and 
promotional resources primarily into Kunming, Xishuangbanna, Dali and Lijiang, successfully 
promoting these as the province’s primary tourist sites. However, Yunnan’s primary tourist 
spots are mainly located in counties that have been designated as non-poor by the central 
government. Not one of the main sites was included in either national or provincial lists of poor 
counties in 1986. Moreover, when Yunnan received the opportunity in 1994 to expand the 
number of poor counties from 41 to 73, they added none to these five areas, although they did 
classify some counties in the vicinity as poor.  
Thus, Yunnan’s most popular tourist sites are in counties that were designated as non-poor 
by 1986. Moreover, of the ten tourism destinations approved by the state between 1982 and 1994 
(which include the province’s more popular sites, as well as some less popular ones), only two 
are in poor regions (the less well-known Three Rivers Pingliu Scenic Area and the Tengchong 
Volcano Area), while eight are in non-poor areas (the Stone Forest, Dianchi Lake, Dali, 
Xishuangbanna, Lijiang, Jianshui, Ruili River, and Jiuxiang). Many poor places with potential 
for development as tourism sites did not receive the government support needed to make them 
viable tourist spots. These include the places, such as Nine Townships and Yuxi’s Alagu Cave, 
that were being prepared in the late 1980s as tourist destinations before the province shifted 
strategies and continued concentrating on its original tourist sites. This pattern of distribution 
contributed to the fact that, though tourism has helped to develop the specific regions in which 
Yunnan province developed sites, investment and growth in the tourism industry has 
contributed primarily to economic growth, and only to a lesser extent to poverty reduction.  
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While the tourist places of Yunnan that received the most government attention and 
investment are in non-poor counties, the opposite is true in Guizhou. According to fieldwork 
and secondary research in Guizhou, tourism in Guizhou is better distributed, with many tourist 
sites, including the most popular, distributed in poor counties (Map 2). Of the eight sites 
selected as national tourist sites in Guizhou, three (Huangguashu, the Zhijin Caves, and the 
Zhang River Scenic Area) are located in poor counties, and three (Longgong Caves, Hongfeng 
Lake, and the Chishui Shaluo Nature Reserve) are in non-poor counties,29 while two (Wuyang 
River Scenic Area and the Fanjing Mountains) are shared by a combination of poor and non-
poor counties.30 Whereas Yunnan restricted its tourist development to specific counties, 
Guizhou spread its tourist development throughout the province, including connecting its 
tourist sites with those of other provinces, encouraging inter-provincial tourism. 
In addition to these nationally and provincially-sponsored tourist destinations, one of the 
key points of Guizhou’s strategy was to establish ethnic minority villages as tourist sites. Ethnic 
minority villages are one of the primary draws for tourists in Guizhou, which the government, 
led by the Guizhou Tourism Bureau, developed gradually beginning in the 1990s and usually 
located in poor counties. For instance, the two most frequently visited ethnic villages in western 
Guizhou, Heitu and Changlinggang, were developed with funds provided by the Guiyang 
branch of the Overseas Travel Corporation, a state-owned company (Oakes 1998, p. 177). For 
example, two of these villages, the Miao villages of Langde (described below) and Xijiang are 
both located in the Leishan County, one of Guizhou’s poorest counties, ranking 81 of 87 
                                                     
29 The Longgong caves, Guizhou’s second most famous scenic spot, is located in a non-poor county but 
borders on a poor county. 
30 Tourism at Fanjing Mountain brought revenues of RMB 45.7 million to the poor county of Yinjiang 
within five years after it had been developed in 1990, amounting to 17 percent of the county’s total 
production value, while sales of tourism commodities brought profits of RMB 620,000, according to one 
source (Wang and Zhang 2003, p. 588). 
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counties in net rural income in 1991. Guizhou’s tourism administration established two routes, a 
western spur of ethnic villages that can be visited along with Huangguashu and other major 
tourist sites in Guizhou, as well as an eastern spur in some of China’s poorest areas. As these 
and other ethnic villages were opened up with government investment, and succeeded in 
attracting tourism, they became models for villages of other ethnicities that were subsequently 
established as tourist sites. By the mid-1990s, twelve such rural minority villages in eastern 
Guizhou and seven in the west developed for tourism quickly became among Guizhou’s most 
popular tourist sites (Oakes 1998). The majority of these are located in designated poor counties. 
Therefore, while Yunnan’s sites are primarily located in non-poor counties, Guizhou’s most 
popular sites, including those nationally-sponsored tourist sites, as well as the ethnic minority 
villages, were primarily located in poor counties.  
In addition to distribution, the structure of tourism in the two provinces also helps explain 
our puzzle. At first, the tourist industry in Yunnan province was relatively simple and 
structured to incorporate participation of rural residents. Just as tourist areas in Dali and 
Xishuangbanna were becoming popular primarily among foreign backpackers, local rural 
residents and local governments stepped in to provide basic infrastructure – roads, hotels and 
restaurants – needed to attract a wider range of tourists. Nevertheless, even from the early 
1980s, much of the profits from the tourism industry leaked out of the local areas. For instance, 
Xishuangbanna Tourism Bureau officials estimate that between 15 to 40 percent of supplies and 
goods used in the tourist industry are imported from outside the prefecture (Wen and Tisdell 
2001, p. 246). By the early 1990s, the infrastructure facilities in these places became increasingly 
elaborate, and much of the investment increasingly was sourced from Kunming-based, coastal 
and some overseas investors. To provide a channel for investment, in early 1993, Yunnan’s 
departments of finance and tourism, and the local branch of Bank of China incorporated the 
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Yunnan Provincial Tourism Development Company. The company was charged with steering 
funding into Yunnan’s key tourism development projects in these regions, including “tourism 
real estate and tourism products,” and to attract outside investment.31 As a part of their effort to 
formalize investment in tourist spots, Yunnan’s tourism administrators realized the need for 
sensitivity to the needs of investors, and adopted, in the mid-1990s, the principle of “whoever 
invests, whoever develops, is the one to profit.” This investment was used to construct star-
rated hotels and larger restaurants, to organize Hollywoodized versions of local customs, to 
complete larger transportation infrastructure such as airports and major highways, to build 
resorts, and even to market local handicrafts and cultural items. These provisions increased the 
scale and profitability of the tourism industry, but gradually excluded participation of local 
rural residents, and benefited outside, primarily coastal, investors.  
By the early 1990s, the infrastructure of these four tourist areas was relatively large in scale, 
as the industry transitioned from backpacker-led tourism to a more formalized and structured 
tourist industry. The hotel industry, for instance, increasingly focused on building star-rated 
hotels.32 While local rural residents continued to serve as cooks, waiters and cleaners in many of 
the hotels and restaurants, and food grown by poor people was bought to feed wealthy tourists, 
relatively small portions of the profits trickled down to the poor. Even as rural residents still 
managed some smaller-scale hotels and restaurants, a large portion of the tourist dollars 
accrued to coastal investors and local governments, and much of the profit did not so much 
tickle down to the poor as it did leak into coastal China. Moreover, as tourism in Yunnan grew 
                                                     
31 For instance, in 1993, Yunnan announced its intention of attracting some US$ 1.9 billion in 57 projects 
related to its vacation spots. 
32 While in 1991, Yunnan had a total of 47 hotels, 10 of which were star-rated, by 1996, the province had 
constructed 168 tourist hotels (eight of which were foreign invested), 82 of which were star rated, 
including six three-star and four four-star hotels. 32 Moreover, for the 1995-2000 period, Yunnan planned 
a three-star hotel for every prefecture capital, and starred hotels in each of its 128 counties. 
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in sophistication, the industry demanded more elaborate skills, further excluding rural 
residents from tourism-related jobs. Thus, while tourism has been a major driver of economic 
growth in Yunnan, the way the industry has been structured excludes many poor people from 
participation. This pattern is repeated in the most popular tourist spots of Xishuangbanna, Dali 
and Lijiang, as well as the more recently promoted “Shangri-la” County. Whereas the latter 
tourist destination, unlike the others, is located in a poor county, the structure of tourism there 
largely precludes the participation of the poor.  
From the beginning of the 1990s, Guizhou’s provincial government overtly linked the 
development of the tourism industry with poverty reduction. In contrast to Yunnan’s growth-
oriented strategy, Guizhou’s government was overtly oriented to poverty reduction and the 
stable development of local economies. The province’s attempts to structure the tourist industry 
in a manner that would increase the participation of poor, rural residents was a part of an overt 
strategy to reduce poverty implemented in 1992 under the slogan “the tourism industry 
promotes openness to the outside; use tourism to promote poverty reduction,” (旅游业促进对外
开放，以旅游促进脱贫致富). As Guizhou’s Vice Governor Lou Jiwei argued subsequently in a 
May 1996 speech, 
The tourism industry can spur employment, solve the food shortages among the 
people and reduce poverty. It can also bring income to local governments, and 
improve the healthy, continued and stable development of local economies. 
(China Tourism Yearbook 1996, p. 186)  
In Huangguashu, the provincial government attempted to increase the benefits of tourism 
there for poor people, both by increasing participation on the site itself, and by linking that site 
to nearby smaller-scale tourist attractions and shuttling tourists to some of the numerous ethnic 
minority villages. Instead of focusing on constructing large hotels in rural areas, the local and 
provincial governments, along with the local people, expanded the housing already there to 
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develop an alternative style of tourism, a trend in Chinese tourism, the style of tourism known 
as nongjiale (loosely translated as ‘joyous village life’). This development strategy, which is not 
unique to Guizhou, implies that tourists stay in rustic rural homes, eating food prepared by 
poor people and enjoying ethnic singing, dancing and culture. Thus, in addition to earning 
tourist dollars from selling handmade clothing, jewelry and other items, peasants there also 
directly hosted tourists in their homes. While this is a niche tourist strategy, not appealing to 
many – perhaps most – elite international travelers, the relatively authentic and rustic nature of 
nongjiale tourism appeals to many more hardy tourists. From the province’s point of view, this 
style of tourism contributes to poverty reduction without the more costly infrastructure 
expenditures required in more elaborate forms of tourism. To smooth the transportation of 
locals to such places, local roads have been smoothed, expanded and often paved into two-lane 
roads – far less expensive than the major highways that Yunnan constructed to connect 
Kunming with the province’s major tourist sites.  
During an inspection tour of Guizhou, then Chinese Vice Premier Zhu Rongji offered 
advice to Guizhou that contrasted sharply with that he presented to Yunnan. Whereas in 
Yunnan, he suggested that provincial officials focus on increasing the scale of their tourism 
investments in the province, to Guizhou, Vice Premier Zhu reasoned,  
Tourism is one of your advantages; you have the conditions to develop this 
sector. Just focus on making good use of your abundant natural resources. That 
would be enough. There is no need to invest in all kinds of crazy stuff, like fancy 
hotels. You don’t need to do that. Just make sure you build decent bathrooms, 
and keep them clean. That and a good shower are sufficient… There’s no need to 
thoughtlessly spend money. Focus on efficiency. As tourism develops and the 
transportation conditions improve, that, one day, will be true prosperity. (cited 
in Wright 2003, p. 139) 
In this, Vice Premier Zhu was suggesting a strategy for structuring Guizhou’s tourist sites 
that provincial leaders had by and large already been doing. In this effort, the provincial 
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government declared the strategy to link tourism with poverty reduction a success, claiming 
that 648 ethnic villages had been opened as tourism sites, increasing incomes sufficiently to 
bring nearly 100,000 households and 330,000 people out of poverty by October 1996 (Guizhou 
Nianjian 1997, p. 589). Chinese Academy of Science researchers (Wang and Zhang 2003) 
studying poverty reduction in Guizhou concur with this assessment, and cite numerous 
examples. For instance, residents of Tianhetan Village, outside of Guiyang, saw their annual 
average per capita income of RMB 200 in 1992 rise to RMB 1200 by 1994. Taxes from tourism at 
Wuyang River consist of one-third of the budget of Shibin County, and increased the income of 
one village by RMB 180 per capita. Even if such claims are exaggerated, secondary western and 
Chinese sources, Chinese statistics and fieldwork indicate that the style of tourism in these 
nongjiale ethnic villages limited the industry to more rugged travelers, but ensured that poor 
people profited more directly. Moreover, they indicate that Guizhou province developed tourist 
attractions, intentionally structuring them so that poor people could participate more in the 
tourism industry in these areas.  
In sum, the various ways the tourism industry in Yunnan and Guizhou has been structured 
affects the extent to which it reduced poverty or stimulated economic growth. Yunnan’s large-
scale industry in many ways reduced the degree of participation of poor people in the tourism 
sector, and by the early 1990s, the industry in the main rural tourist destinations in the 
provinces that had been previously developed largely exhausted its potential for poverty 
reduction. Further investment continued to develop these sites, and the tourism infrastructure 
in these places increased in quality and scale. While many poor people benefited from tourism 
in these places, the main beneficiaries of these large-scale activities were non-poor residents, as 
well as investors, many from the east coast. In Guizhou, on the other hand, many activities and 
sites are structured to be small in scale; in these, poor rural residents benefit directly by hosting 
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tourists, both foreign and domestic. Although the prices involved – and thus the profits – are 
usually quite modest, they play a significant role for poor people. Thus, the examples of 
Guizhou and Yunnan demonstrate that the structure of an industry (and thus its effect on 
economic growth and poverty reduction) depends to a large extent on whether it is labor- or 
capital-intensive, and whether it generates employment for local residents.  
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Section 5: Conclusion - Go to the practical people and learn from them, then synthesize their 
experience into principles and theories. (Mao Zedong, Selected Works III) 
This research revealed that the different patterns of economic growth and poverty 
reduction in the two provinces can be partially explained through their disparate approaches to 
similar factors including roads, migration, tourism (and coal mining – not discussed here). 
While these elements proved to be important in both cases, it is the variation within each of 
them that explains the differing patterns of economic growth and poverty reduction in Yunnan 
and Guizhou. It is the policy approaches taken by these provinces, not just geographic or 
economic factors, that shaped these elements. 
This is not a traditional ‘state-vs.-market’ argument (of course ‘states matter’), since the 
results of this research suggest that it is the particular role the state plays and the strategy it 
adopts that is important. For instance, regarding roadway, both provinces established policies 
and plans at the same time, but they did so in contrasting ways. Yunnan’s strategy most clearly 
emulates that of a developmental state, promoting large-scale construction intended to 
maximize economic growth largely through industrial growth. Guizhou’s strategy, on the other 
hand, focused on small-scale activities and poverty reduction. A similar story can be found with 
migration. Guizhou’s strategy toward its surplus labor force incorporated attempts to export its 
labor to Guizhou’s urban, mining and industrial centers, as well as outside the province, 
especially to coastal cities. Guizhou’s 1986 “Directives on Strengthening Work in Poor Areas,” 
the province’s first formal anti-poverty policy of the reform era suggested that some central and 
provincial policies had to be relaxed to deal with poverty, among them policies proscribing 
population movements.33 The migration spurred by government initiatives multiplied, as the 
                                                     
33 This policy directs labor departments at all levels of government to organize rural laborers in poor 
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dynamics of chain migration took effect. By contrast, any effort to spur migration remains 
absent from any of Yunnan’s anti-poverty policies. Yunnan’s rapidly increasing growth 
attracted relatively few native migrants, but did encourage many from other provinces to 
migrate to Yunnan (Liang and White 1997; Zhu and Poncet 2003). The strategies adopted by the 
government for tourism were also quite overt. From the early 1990s, Yunnan made investments 
in tourism that stimulated the province’s development and economic growth, while Guizhou at 
that time was the first province to link overtly tourism with rural poverty reduction. In doing 
so, Yunnan once again appeared to be spurring economic growth and development, whereas 
Guizhou seems to be foregoing growth-oriented activities, but maximizing the benefit of 
tourism for poor people by focusing on small scale activities. 
Yunnan overall appears to be close to emulating the strategy of a typical developmental 
state, by focusing planning and investment in selected industries (such as tourism and tobacco), 
and sourcing the resources and infrastructure needed to support it. As with most 
developmental states, Yunnan’s primary goal is towards economic growth, obtained in part by 
attempting to shift labor, profits and other resources out of agriculture and into industry, and to 
achieve economies of scale large enough to increase significantly productivity growth.34 
However, by focusing its resources on a limited area (primarily the overall development of 
central areas, of tourism in the south and parts of the northwest, and tobacco in the southwest) 
and a limited range of industrial sectors, supported in part by the construction of an extensive 
                                                                                                                                                                           
areas of Guizhou to migrate for work. It further requires departments over labor-intensive industries, 
such as mining and forestry, to reserve quotas for migrant workers to serve as contract or shift workers 
(Guizhou Yearbook 1987, p. 71). By 1993, the province, reporting on successful aspects of its anti-poverty 
programs, noted that five counties in three prefectures organized the migration of more 50,000 rural 
laborers, who remitted on average approximately RMB 800 (Guizhou Yearbook 1994, p. 277).  
34 Other evidence that suggest Yunnan is a developmental state includes a notable urban bias, heavy 
taxation of agriculture (even by China standards) and extensive government expenditure and investment. 
A lack of space precludes further discussion of these. 
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highway system, Yunnan concentrated its resources. Moreover, many of the decisions made by 
Yunnan’s provincial government, such as focusing the development of its tourism industry in 
specific areas, and attempting to develop larger-scale coal-based TVEs, effectively nurtured the 
growth of those sectors and the economy as a whole. However, in doing so, Yunnan’s decisions 
excluded large poor regions, primarily in the province’s southeast, northeast and most of its 
west, and structured industries in ways that made participation by poor people difficult.  
Guizhou, focused as it has been on small-scale industries (exemplified here by tourism, but 
also including coal mining), suggests an alternative model towards poverty reduction, which I 
dub the ‘micro-oriented state.’ This model is characterized by adoption of a primary goal of 
rural poverty reduction through improving rural livelihoods, achieved not only by shifting 
rural labor (through out-of-province migration) but also by increasing opportunities for farmers 
to increase their incomes at home, by augmenting access to local markets and by promoting 
local tourism. The micro-oriented state in this way augments opportunities for poor rural 
people by supporting activities that poor people can access, such as those that require little 
formal education and experience in using technology. In doing so, it rejects the dominant 
strategies of development and poverty reduction that emphasize development based on large-
scale, high-tech industry.35  
Despite providing an alternative pathway to poverty reduction, Guizhou’s record should be 
considered cautiously. While the province has experienced significant poverty reduction, 
impressive compared to endemic poverty throughout the world (despite robust global growth), 
considering the significant barriers the province faced, and particularly in light of its modest 
                                                     
35 As Schumacher argued in a popular book published nearly three decades ago, “Today, we suffer from 
an almost universal idolatry of gigantism. It is therefore necessary to insist on the virtues of smallness – 
where this applies,” (Schumacher 1973, p. 62.)  This is equally true today, when the main thrust of many 
anti-poverty models from all points of the ideological spectrum that emphasize larger scale industries. 
  
39 
economic growth, the province has been and remains poor, with severe poverty persisting in 
many regions. Because the province’s economy is underdeveloped, and remains among the 
lowest as measured by per capita GDP, it is not surprising that skepticism greets the claim that 
Guizhou has anything to offer as a model for poverty reduction. Most people living in Yunnan’s 
cities are more comfortable than those in Guizhou’s, and residents of Yunnan’s tobacco and 
tourism regions live relatively comfortably.  
Nevertheless, life in Yunnan’s impoverished areas is often much harsher than in equivalent 
areas of Guizhou. Moreover, compared to its economic growth rate, Guizhou’s achievements in 
increasing income of poor people to a sufficient degree to pull millions of rural residents out of 
poverty is laudable. The model the province used of encouraging indirect economic 
opportunities accessible to poor people to supplement income from agriculture should indeed 
be considered as one of the alternative mechanisms for poverty reduction. No minor feat, 
considering that most models fail to reduce povery, a sobering fact faced by those attempting to 
reduce poverty of all types – rural or urban, in developing or developed countries. Moreover, 
the growth performance of Yunnan has slowed, whereas Guizhou’s has increased, perhaps (a 
cautious ‘perhaps’ since I have yet to investigate this) bolstering arguments that growth is best 
achieved bottom-up (by first addressing poverty), compared to hoping that growth will trickle 
down to the poor (Moon and Dixon 1992). The importance of discovering additional models 
should not be doubted, given the 1.2 billion people that today remain in poverty (Chen and 
Ravallion 2004).  The case of Guizhou suggests (and more research is needed to confirm 
generalizability of this) that in contrast to approaches that emphasize capital-intensive, large-
scale development of the type that spurs economic growth, it is the smaller scale approaches, of 
a kind that are distributed and structured to be accessible to poor people, that can better 
provide the opportunities needed to reduce rural poverty.
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